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Abstract
Sharing information concerning expenditure choices between a migrant and the
recipient affects the migrant’s allocation patterns. In a lab-in-the-field experiment,
Filipino migrants are asked to earmark an in-kind budget to be delivered to their most
closely connected household (MCCH). When the MCCH is fully aware of the
migrant’s decisions (i.e., symmetric information), we observe that the migrant raises
the portion for consumption goods in the range of 10.0–10.5% with respect to the
case when the migrant’s choices are not disclosed (i.e., asymmetric information).
Moreover, when sharing information, the migrant relies on more involvement of the
recipient household and lowers by 7–9% the allocation to expenses she could
monitor ex-post more strictly. The former result is consistent with the signaling
motive, whereas the latter supports the presence of strategic behavior by the migrant
remitter. Education allocations are significantly higher in intra- rather than inter-
household transfers and this provides insights for conditional cash transfer policies.
Keywords In-kind giving ● Signaling motive ● Strategic behavior ● Remittance
motives ● Remitting for education ● Dictator game ● Philippines
JEL codes F24 ● O15 ● D19 ● C92 ● D01
1 Introduction and literature references
Remittances are a fundamental raison d’être for the geographical separation of
transnational households. Intra-household communication and bargaining costs can
be higher in transnational than in co-resident households, creating potential
* Giuseppe De Arcangelis
giuseppe.dearcangelis@uniroma1.it
1 DISSE, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, P.le Aldo Moro 5, Rome 00185, Italy
2 DEM (Department of Economics and Management), University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
12
34
56
78
90
()
;,:
Author's personal copy
incentives for the remitter to impose restrictions on the use of transmitted funds (see
Seshan and Zubrickas 2015). Observing decisions about whether to target remit-
tances to particular uses offers economists an opportunity to investigate intra-
household transfers and related expenditure choices that can be difficult to observe in
co-resident households.1
The literature on altruism and reciprocal giving has thoroughly investigated how
the presence of divergent preferences may induce the dictator/giver to give in kind
rather than in cash to express control over the consumption of the recipient. The
Samaritan’s dilemma, proposed by Buchanan (1975) and formalized by Bruce and
Waldman (1991), justifies giving in kind because the recipient may make some
expenditure decisions (i.e., buying an expensive car rather than paying for college)
that are not welfare enhancing in the long run, counting on further bequests later
in life.
In this paper, we examine how the composition of in-kind remittances from a list
of goods—rearranged as consumption-type and investment-type2 goods or as ver-
ifiable and strictly-verifiable—may change depending on what the recipient house-
hold knows. In case the household can observe the list, the migrant’s decision
process is fully disclosed when the goods are delivered. Sharing information on the
choice sets may affect the migrant’s decisions ex-ante with respect to the case when
the migrant knows that her choices are not disclosed to the recipient household.
In terms of contribution to the current literature, our work provides some new
insights on intra-household allocation of in-kind transfers. At the same time, it relates
to the literature on remittances and links two approaches: one that underlines the
importance of information asymmetries, and the other that investigates in-kind
allocation decisions. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the role
of information sharing when the transfer is in kind and the giver decides the allo-
cation amongst a closed set of goods. The main research question is whether the
giver’s (migrant’s) in-kind choices change depending on whether the recipient
(household) is aware of those choices.
Under one explanation when the migrant knows to be observed ex-post (this is the
case of symmetric information) she is more likely to adapt to the preferences of the
recipient household, which is probably more impatient, and tending to prefer con-
sumption over investment. The dominant motive for remitting can then be associated
with the signaling model: by changing the composition of the in-kind bundle and
knowing she is observed, the migrant wants to signal knowledge of the recipient’s
preferences, as in Prendergest and Stole (2001). Our results confirm that there is a
significant change when the information scenario varies. On the one hand, this
outcome ascertains that there is effectively a divergence in preferences between the
migrant-giver and the household-recipient. On the other, by assuming that pre-
ferences are not coincident (some evidence is reported in Section 2.3), our result
offers support for the signaling motive.
1 See Beblo and Beninger (2017) for recent evidence on in-couple income pooling.
2 We use the term “investment-type” to refer to all choices that imply future consumption and/or an
increase in household wealth, also in terms of human capital—as for the case of education. An alternative
appropriate term would be “household saving-type”.
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Another explanation for choosing different sets under shared information can be
related to the strategic behavior of the migrant. Choosing (strictly) verifiable
expenditures3 implies stronger constraints for the recipient whose actual spending
behavior can be monitored ex-post. For instance, funds labeled as “saving for others”
are more easily distracted rather than transfers indicated to “buy a car”, whose
implementation can be verified with the actual presence of a vehicle. Under shared
(or symmetric) information the migrant may decide to lower the portion of verifiable
expenditures since sharing the choices observationally would induce the recipient to
feel more obliged to follow the indications of the giver. Indeed, we find that under
information sharing the portion of (strictly) verifiable goods significantly decreases.
Finally, we exploited the wide variety of kinship between the migrant-giver and
the household-recipient in our sample. We have compared transfers that could be
more strictly defined as intra-household—for instance, when the head of the
household is a spouse—versus inter-household—as in the case of transfers to a sister
or an uncle. Our results highlight significant differences between intra- and inter-
household transfers where the former lean towards more productive (investment-
type) goods. This conclusion supports the policy design of conditional cash transfers
programs based on the intra-household transfer hypothesis (see, for instance recently,
Bergolo and Galván 2018 and Aycinena et al. 2019).
Our study is closely linked to De Arcangelis et al. (2015) and uses data from the
same experiment. In De Arcangelis et al. (2015) the main research objective regarded
in-cash transfers and, in accordance to the literature on unconditional cash transfers,
they find that labeling remittances for education increased transfers relatively more
than other more constrained forms of transmitting funds home (such as directing
remittances directly to the schools or universities). They found a limited effect of
information asymmetry on the in-cash transfers. This current work is complementary
and uses the data on the in-kind rather the in-cash transfers of the experiment in order
to investigate the role of shared information on the allocation choices.
A range of recent studies has empirically tested the role of information sharing in
intra-household transfer decisions (Ashraf 2009), raising doubts over the unitary
model of the household. Many results have challenged the proposition that the joint
actions of a household that contains separate optimizing individuals can be repre-
sented as the actions of a single utility-maximizing agent. For instance, Maitra and
Ray (2006) show how expenditure patterns change depending on the member of the
household that receives income assistance in a South African case. Reynolds (2015)
studies the special household case of teenage mothers and their mothers in Brazil to
test the cooperative nature of a household. These studies explore how under different
settings the members may take diverse allocation decisions regarding the available
resources.
Other contributions suggest that there is a relevant desire to control and monitor
the usage of the in-kind or in-cash gifts that are sent to the recipient. Ambler (2015)
shows that information asymmetry on the source of a windfall gain that originates
money transfers from the migrant-sender to the household-recipient may affect the
level of remittances. She uses data collected from an experiment with migrants from
El Salvador and concludes that migrants remit more in cases when their decisions are
3 See Section 2.1 for the definition of monitored verifiable goods.
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revealed to the recipient. Chen (2006) studies wife-husband behavior in China and
finds that they exhibit non-cooperative strategies for activities that are difficult to
monitor. De Laat (2014) concludes that Kenyan migrants spend resources to monitor
their wives. Batista et al. (2015) show that inter-household transfers are also made in
kind when the possibility to allocate between in-kind and in-cash resources is ran-
domly given to individuals in an experimental setting. Information asymmetries
induce strategic behavior among household members that can cause different
consumption-investment decisions (Ashraf 2009) or strategic appropriation of
resources (Anderson and Baland 2002).
Our study wants to bridge these two approaches by investigating the allocation
decision of an in-kind budget when information is or is not shared between the giver
and the recipient. To our knowledge, a study that analyses the role of information
asymmetry when the transfer (remittance) is in in-kind resources and the giver
(dictator) decides the allocation from a closed list of goods, has not yet been pro-
posed. In particular, we want to check whether, given the amount of in-kind
resources to transfer, information asymmetry may play an important role in the
composition of the given budget between in-kind consumption-type goods and in-
kind investment-type choices, or between in-kind budget indications that can be more
or less monitored. In the literature, motives for giving in kind are still being dis-
cussed. Competing models that are relevant for our experimental setup are the public-
private good model and the signaling model, whereas the presence of asymmetric
information can also justify the strategic behavior by the migrant-giver in providing
resources with more or fewer constraints, i.e., choosing budget indications with
different monitoring characteristics.
In the following section, we report the experimental design and we focus on the
in-kind portion of the experiment. The estimation strategy and the empirical results
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with some policy implications.
2 Experimental setting
The experiment was conducted with Filipino migrants working in Rome (Italy)
during 2012–2013. At that time, in Italy, the estimated number of Filipino migrants
(generally defined as OFW, Overseas Filipino Workers) was approximately 113,000,
remitting about US$370 million, on average, back to the Philippines each year.
Filipinos are a small minority of the overall population of Rome, and for this
reason, intercept-point sampling was used for this study (see De Arcangelis et. al
2015). Between August 2012 and January 2013, 2291 Filipino migrants were
intercepted at common meeting points in Rome and at the main branch in Rome of
the Bank for Philippine Islands (BPI), which was one of the partners of the project to
implement the direct payment.4
4 Intercepts were scheduled at various times on a variety of days of the week. The intercept points were
five fixed locations: the Santa Pudenziana Filipino community church, the Bank of the Philippine Islands
Rome branch, the Embassy of the Philippines, the headquarters of an important Filipino NGO (OFSPES),
and the central train station in Rome (Termini Station).
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The migrants were invited to participate in the survey by first receiving a general
introduction to the research project, which was described as “about the lives and
financial decisions of OFWs in Rome, and about the remittances they send home to
the Philippines.” Once the migrants agreed to participate, they had to answer some
preliminary screening questions to determine their eligibility to participate in the
survey. To be considered eligible, a respondent had to meet two criteria: (i) the
province of origin of the migrant and of his/her “mostly closely connected house-
hold” (MCCH, i.e., the household where they lived before migrating, or the
household they send the most remittances to) should be in one of three regions of the
Philippines where there were established contacts with schools and universities to
implement the direct payment, and (ii) to have a relative in the Philippines aged
5–22. If the migrants did not refuse to answer further questions, then the interview
began, and they were given a further explanation of the project.5
The fieldwork produced a sample of 501 migrant workers who were equally and
randomly assigned to three different treatments regarding information sharing with
the MCCH. The interview lasted approximately 40–45 min and was divided into
three main sections: one initial section on the budget allocations of in-kind goods and
services that is the main focus of the current analysis, a second section as a baseline
survey, and a third section that included two lab-in-the-field experiments.
2.1 In-kind budget allocations under different information scenarios
As the survey started, the migrants were told that they would be eligible for a lottery
of 1000 euros and that the choices they made would be implemented at the end of the
project, exactly as they had stated during the interview, in case of a win.6 The sample
was randomized into three treatment groups of equal number (167 individuals each)
where the migrants made choices under three different scenarios of information
symmetry/asymmetry with the MCCH.
The MCCH was told that the funds to acquire the goods or to make the monetary
transfers (needed for the financial services) were obtained as a reward to the migrant
for participating in important research. The three treatments were designed around
two main modes of information sharing with the MCCH on the choices of the
migrant. Before deciding how to allocate any budget (in terms of in-kind goods and
services or how to remit the win), the migrants knew whether the MCCH was
informed of the closed list from which the migrant picked her choices. The three
treatments are described as follows.
1. Treatment 1: Private Information. In case of a lottery win the MCCH in the
Philippines would receive the goods and the monetary transfers according to
what the migrant had stated during the interview, but the MCCH was not to be
given any information on the alternative goods or services that could have been
5 The statement was the following: “We will also be offering you a new product related to education and
remittances at the end of the survey, and you may benefit from using this product.”More details on EduPay
can be found in De Arcangelis et al. (2015).
6 The lottery was actually implemented on 28 March 2013.
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chosen. In other words, at the time of the allocation decision, the migrant would
make her choices knowing that she is not observed ex-post.
2. Treatment 2: Full Information Sharing. In this treatment group, the migrants
made their choices knowing that the MCCH in the Philippines would be fully
informed of which goods and services they had chosen from a list. In this
scenario, the migrants’ decisions may be affected by the ex-post full disclosure
of their preferences to the MCCH. Although the interviewee was initially told
by the enumerator “It could be anything that you want us to give them (not
what you think your family would want),” the information sharing could affect
migrants’ decisions over what to pick from the list.
3. Treatment 3: Information Sharing+ Social Excuse. As in Treatment 2, the
household in the Philippines would be fully informed of all the choices made
but would also be told that “a small donation to a Filipino organization in
Rome” was made when the financial facility available via the experiment,
named EduPay (see De Arcangelis et al. 2015), was chosen. Hence, the
migrants in this group know that they would be observed in their choices as in
Treatment 2 but know also that a social excuse could justify expenditure in
education when allocating the windfall of the lottery.
Once the migrants in each group were told of the type of information sharing, the
interview could begin.7 In the first experiment, the migrants were asked to divide the
1000 euros across a list of goods and services that were going to be delivered in kind
to their MCCH. The migrant knew that the choices declared during the survey would
be fulfilled exactly as she divided the 1000 Euros in case of a win.8
Table 1 reports the list of the goods and the regrouping that we propose in our
analysis. The consumption-type goods and services items are broken down into three
groups: (i) basic and regular expenditure, such as food, clothes, rent, and utility
payments; (ii) durable consumption, including house repairs; and (iii) services, such
as medical expenditures, insurance payments, and marriage expenses. For the
investment-type goods, we separated education expenses because the interview
stressed this item at the start and may have over-sensitized the migrant on this
expenditure. The other investment goods are gathered into three sets, as (i) residential
investment, including expenditure related to house or land; (ii) financial investment,
considering different forms of saving related to intertemporal reallocations to buy
durables, finance marriage expenses, and cover emigration projects, or forms of long-
term financial investment; and (iii) business investment, as agricultural inputs or
direct business expenses.9
7 Enumerators were instructed to inform the interviewee of the type of information sharing with the
MCHH at the beginning of the survey, and a special ID code was assigned for each treatment. The survey
instrument is available upon request and shows that the migrant is reminded of the types of information
sharing again at the beginning of the experiment in the second part.
8 Migrants were told that they would not be allowed to change their allocation decision if they later learned
that they had won the lottery, so they should take the allocation decision seriously.
9 Residual items as Other expenses are included into the consumption group and Saving for other in the
investment group as business item. As Table (2) shows, the quantity of funds for Other expenses is
negligible, but we decided to include them to equal 1000 euros for the budget assigned. When taking them
out of the analysis, nothing changes. Results are available upon request.
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Allocations are also differentiated depending on the degree of monitoring that can
be exercised ex-post by the migrant-giver. Some of the in-kind indications—such as
the durable goods—can be physically verified in case (and/or when) the migrant
returns, while for others some forms of invoicing are standard practice even in the
context of an emerging economy like the Philippines. We pick parsimoniously one
most representative items in each of the sub-categories reported in Table 1 (basic,
durable and services for consumption, and residential, financial, business and edu-
cation for investment) and define such in-kind expenditures as verifiable goods and
they include: utilities payments, consumption durables that would necessarily and
more likely imply some form of invoicing, medical expenditures, constrained forms
of savings,10 long-term investment, agricultural inputs, education expenses.11 A
subset of strictly verifiable goods is also proposed for robustness check and includes
only durables among the consumption set, constrained savings and education
expenses in the investment set. The portion of verifiable goods may depend on the
possibility of sharing or not sharing information with the MCCH under the
hypothesis of strategic behavior by the migrant: the need to include more verifiable
goods is lower under shared information since the disclosure of allocation choices
Table 1 Breakdown of goods and services allocated in-kind
Food
Basic
Consumpon-type 
goods and services
Clothes
Rent payment
Ulies payment (electricity, water, etc.)
Phone (house, cell phone, calling cards)
Large goods for the household (durables)
DurablesCar or other vehicle
Construcon of a house (including repairs)
Medical expenditure and medicines
Services
Insurance (life, health, etc.)
Marriage expenses
Other expenses
Savings to buy a house
Residenal
Investment-type goods
Savings to buy a land
Down payment on a house/land
Current mortgage on a house/land
Savings to buy a vehicle
Financial
Savings for marriage expenses
Long-term investments
Emigraon expenditures
Agricultural inputs
BusinessBusiness expenses
Savings for other
Educaon expenses Educaon
Verifiable goods
Strictly Verifiable goods
10 See footnote 20 in Appendix A.
11 Other aggregates have been used in the empirical analysis without significant changes. Additional
material is available from the authors upon request.
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may imply more compelling behavior of the MCCH who would feel involved in the
choice decision.
Table 2 presents some basic summary statistics of the budget allocations for
the whole sample and distinguishes the three treatment groups. Independently of the
treatment group, the highest expenditure item (approximately 312 euros for the whole
sample and ranging between 276 and 345 euros among the treatment groups) is always
education. This result is an expected outcome because the interview stressed the issue of
financing education at home. The second highest type of expenditure is consistently
food for the three treatments (approximately 117 euros for the whole sample). The most
volatile choice is the expenditure on the house (construction and repair) ranging
between 48 and 117 euros. We ought to notice how the allocations for Treatments (2)
and (3) are very similar to one another and very different from Treatment (1).
In the Appendix A, we provide the section of the survey instrument with the list of
all of the choices as presented to the interviewee.
2.2 The baseline survey
After the budget allocation, the baseline survey collected information on the
migrants’ demographic background, labor market status, remitting behavior, and the
quality of their relationship with the MCCH in the Philippines (e.g., measures of
Table 2 Summary statistics of the in-kind allocations for the three treatments
Private Informaon 
(T1)
Full Informaon 
Sharing (T2)
Full Informaon 
Sharing + Social 
Excuse (T3) Whole Sample
Amount in euro allocated for: Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
noitp
musnoC
Food 104,79 159,65 122,27 157,9 120,64 157,92 116,66 159,14
Clothes 15,15 47,65 28,92 86,82 24,86 67,98 22,93 69,4
Rent payment 2,69 22,13 13,83 56,46 23,43 113,38 13,27 74,4
Ulies payment 26,95 63,95 31,53 64,63 30 65,09 29,83 64,84
Phone payment 4,73 24,43 7,53 31,54 4,94 19,56 5,92 25,96
Large goods (durables) 3,29 23,37 7,78 78,38 3,92 33,02 4,99 50,84
Car or other vehicle 0 0 12,87 109,62 7,11 60,5 6,65 72,29
Construcon house and repairs 48,5 184,28 81 217,24 117,47 279,17 82,09 231,23
Medical expenditure and medicines 68,5 148,61 56,43 103,56 78,59 164,37 68,28 141,41
Insurance (life, health, etc.) 23,17 123,95 27,69 126,77 24,34 121,13 25,02 123,62
Marriage expenses 1,8 23,21 0 0 3,01 38,81 1,6 26,03
Other expenses 15,57 111,93 2,78 23,4 9,64 84,01 9,31 81,84
tne
mtsevnI
Savings to buy a house 17,66 108,12 23,29 118,21 0,6 7,76 13,85 92,92
Savings to buy a land 36,83 163,75 23,6 124,36 5,42 43 21,94 121,71
Down payment on house/land 7,9 50,6 8,98 86,31 14,16 95,64 10,32 79,68
Current mortgage on house/land 7,19 44,68 10,78 98,81 18,98 103,36 12,28 86,34
Savings to buy a vehicle 5,69 43,71 18,26 121,41 4,82 42,37 9,58 78,47
Savings for marriage expenses 13,77 111,35 0 0 0,3 3,88 4,69 64,52
Long-term investment 65,87 205,14 58,68 212,7 56,63 189,54 60,28 202,16
Emigraon expenses 4,19 47,02 7,49 66,91 0,3 3,88 3,99 47,27
Agricultural inputs 37,43 150,67 27,54 142,23 17,77 81,28 27,54 128,45
Business expenditure 35,33 151,43 25,45 141,3 52,2 198,25 37,56 165,34
Savings for other 107,78 284,38 84,91 251,95 101 278,84 97,7 271,47
Educaon expenses 344,91 349,17 318,95 350,9 276,27 332,41 312,82 344,7
TOTAL 999,69 1000,56 996,4 999,1
Observaons 167 167 167 501
Verifiable goods
Strictly Verifiable goods
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trust). Summary statistics are reported in Table 3. The sample contains 73% female,
and the average (and median) age of the respondents is 42. Most (70%) of the
migrants have a college or a university degree and have been living in Italy for
approximately 7 years (median). Only 21% of the respondents has never married, and
only 5 % has their spouse with them in Italy. Nearly 68% of the respondents are
employed as domestic workers, with the other main occupations being housecleaners
(8%) and caregivers (6%). The median wage is 900 euro per month. Almost 96%
have remitted regularly to the MCCH in the Philippines in the last 12 months, and
72% remit monthly. The median amount of remittances is 380 euros/month. The
characteristics of our sample closely resemble the socio-economic patterns of the
Filipino population residing in Italy.12
2.3 Preference dissimilarity
In Table 4, we report the relevant questions in the survey instrument that could
provide an idea of the relationship between the migrant and the MCCH. The migrant
does not seem to be well-informed (see Question C3), but she shares a general
agreement (Question C4) and participates in the MCCH decisions (Question C5).
However, we notice a difference between wishing to have more influence in general
and wishing to have more influence “over the overall budget.” In this latter case, both
mean and median above 50% indicate that the migrant would affect how the money
is spent rather than having a general influence over the MCCH. We deem this result
as preliminary evidence of divergence in preferences.
The detection of non-coincident preferences can be complemented with a direct
and an indirect measure of trust between the migrant and the MCCH. First, according
to the last line in Table 4, the answers to Question C9 reveal a very high level of trust
between the migrant and the MCCH, scoring 9.08 out of 10 in the mean. An
alternative (although indirect) measure of trust is obtained from the dictator game that
the migrant played in the last part of the interview. The migrant was asked to declare
how much of the 1000 euros to allocate between herself and the head of the MCCH,
who then chooses how much to keep for himself and how much to send back to the
migrant, knowing that the amount he sends back is doubled. When the level of trust
is very high, the optimal choice is to send 1000 euros counting on the whole amount
being sent back entirely. In the end, both the migrant and the MCCH would have
2000 euros, i.e., the maximum amount. Figure 1 shows that most migrants chose to
split exactly the initial amount and that a high percentage (27.2%) decided to send
zero. Only 10.4% fully trusted the head of the MCCH sending 1000 euros.
The evidence of low or imperfect trust can be associated with information
asymmetries between the two parties since they reside in two different markets, or
with non-coincident preferences. The rest of our analysis may provide further evi-
dence on this interpretation.
12 Italia Lavoro, 2013. “The Philippine Community in Italy”, Annual Report on the Presence of Immi-
grants. Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, Government of Italy.
Intra-household allocation with shared expenditure choices: experimental evidence from. . .
Author's personal copy
3 Empirical evidence
Section (2.3) reported evidence on the preference divergence between the migrant and
the MCCH. When considering consumption and investment goods, there are practical
reasons to expect that the migrant leans towards a higher portion of the remittances
spent on investment, while the MCCH prefers consumption. In the logic of the public
goods model, for instance, investment goods may be preferred because migrants can
enjoy the related returns when returning home in the future. Instead, consumption goods
Table 3 Baseline summary statistics
Mean SD Min Median Max Observations
Migrant is a female 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 501
Migrant’s age 42.25 10.32 19.00 42.00 71.00 499
Migrant is married 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 501
Migrant’s number of children 1.95 1.47 0.00 2.00 8.00 501
Migrant’s year in Italy 9.68 8.56 0.00 7.00 38.00 499
Migrant’s Phil. citizenship 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 1.00 500
Migrant is employed 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 1.00 499
Migrant is self-employed 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 488
Migrant’s monthly income (€) 1045.18 566.42 0.00 900.00 7000.00 481
Migrant’s hours working 42.66 18.87 0.00 40.00 88.00 499
Migrant is remitting monthly 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 501
Remittances monthly (€) 412.54 299.17 0.00 380.00 3000.00 499
Household efficiency and trust 0.608 0.310 0.00 0.5 1 500
All variables are from 2012 baseline survey of migrant
Table 4 Communication with the MCCH to evaluate the difference in preference
Mean SD Min Median Max Observations
Question C3: How well informed are you about
what is going on in MCCH: very well informed,
well informed, not well informed, or not
informed?
1.36 0.62 1.00 1.00 4.00 500
Question C4: Have you had any disagreements
with anyone in MCCH household regarding
remittances in the last twelve months?
0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 500
Question C5: Do you participate in the decisions
regarding how remittances sent to MCCH are
spent?
0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 500
Question C6: Do you wish you had more
influence over how MCCH spends your
remittance money?
0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 498
Question C7: Do you wish you had more
influence over the overall budget in MCCH?
0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 496
Question C9: How much do you trust the
persons in your MCCH the Philippines given a
scale from 1–10?
9.08 1.54 1.00 10.00 10.00 499
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(especially nondurables like food) are exclusively enjoyed by the MCCH as private
goods. As the data show, when the migrant decides budget allocations knowing that her
choices would not be observed by the MCCH, she apportions a higher share to
investment goods. Alternatively, expense allocations can be broken down depending on
the ability to monitor them. A variation of expenditure share between the two groups
could reveal strategic behavior of the migrant-giver.
In our experiment, there are two scenarios for information. Scenario (1) of private
information (or information asymmetry) corresponds to Treatment (1), and Scenario
(2) of information sharing (or information symmetry) includes Treatments (2) and
(3). The regression analysis presented below shows that this latter two treatments are
statistically indistinguishable and can be merged.
In the next section, we present some preliminary descriptive statistics, then we
describe the regression analysis and the estimation results.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
As prima facie evidence, Fig. 2 reports the average expenditure levels in euros for
both divisions in consumption-investment and in verifiable/strictly-verifiable goods,
as grouped in Table 1, for the two scenarios.
The total consumption budget increases significantly from 315 euros to 396 euros,
and total investment shrinks from 685 euros to 578 euros. Average changes are not
evenly distributed and that there is a significant reshuffling. The greatest decline in
consumption is observed for durables (from 115 to 52 euros) when the migrants
decide with a blinded MCCH in scenario (1). This is evidence of a significant change
and in line with preference divergence and signaling motive to give. Expenditure in
services on average slightly rises.
In scenario (2), the allocation for total investment decreases by 107 euros, and
the decline is consistent among the four aggregate items. The largest decline is
observed for business investment and education. As discussed above, the decrease
in the latter may be due to the design of the experiment and of the interview. By
announcing at the start that the migrant will be able to send money for education
from the eventual lottery win, education expenses can be considered as more
136
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Fig. 1 Distribution of migrants in the trust game as evidence of preference divergence
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fungible in the in-kind budget allocation. Instead, the fall in business investment
may indicate that the migrant has a more entrepreneurial attitude when she can
decide with full autonomy.
The reshuffling is evident also when the expenditure indications are divided as
more or less subject to monitoring. The histograms on the further right side of
Fig. 2 show significant changes between the two scenarios. Under shared infor-
mation the portion of verifiable goods is lower by more than 90 euros (530 versus
621 euros) and the share of strictly verifiable goods is 352 euros instead of 422
euros. A possible interpretation is that the migrant-giver does not need to choose a
higher portion of (strictly) verifiable goods when also the household-recipient
observes the allocation choice and would feel compelled to implement the
expenditure choices.
Additional preliminary evidence is given in Figs. 3, 4 where we plot the cumu-
lative distribution functions of the consumption-investment breakdown and for the
(strictly) verifiable categories for the two scenarios. Figure 3a shows the statistical
dominance of consumption under Full Information Sharing meaning that the
budget allocated for in-kind consumption goods is higher at any probability level
when the migrant knows that the MCCH is fully informed of her choices. This
characteristic holds when considering all consumption subgroups (graphs are avail-
able upon request). Instead, in Fig. 3b there is statistical dominance of the investment
goods allocation for the case of Private Information. In Fig. 4 we also have stochastic
dominance of (strictly) verifiable budgets under Private Information. Budgets for
(strictly) verifiable goods are higher under Private Information for any probability
level. This is evidence in favor of migrant’s strategic behavior, i.e., bending allo-
cation choices towards budgets that needs less monitoring only when allocation
choices are shared with the household-recipient.
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Fig. 2 Breakdown of in-kind aggregate expenditures across the 2 scenarios
G. De Arcangelis, M. Joxhe
Author's personal copy
3.2 Estimation strategy and regression results
The main point of our analysis is to investigate whether allocation choices change
due to information sharing.
Regarding to the distinction between consumption and investment goods and the
non-coincident preferences between the two parties, if no difference arises under
information symmetry or asymmetry, then the logic of the public goods model is
dominant because being observed by the MCCH does not induce any change, i.e.,
always preferring more investment. Instead, if we detect a significant difference, then
the migrant seems to adapt her choices to the MCCH desiderata, although the
migrant is playing a dictator game.
When considering (strictly) verifiable goods, under information sharing there may
be a decrease in their portion if the migrant/dictator assumes that does not need to
(a)
(b)
Consumption Goods 
Investment Goods 
Fig. 3 Cumulative distribution function for consumption and investment goods—Scenario 1 Private
Information (T1) vs Scenario 2 Information Sharing (T2 and T3)
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monitor ex-post the MCCH who would feel compelled to implement the shared
expenditure choices.
Significant changes in allocation choices are supportive evidence in favor of the
signaling motive of in-kind giving by Prendergast and Stole (2001), where the giver
adapts the gift to the recipient’s preferences when observed, and as evidence against
the public good model of in-kind giving.13
Fig. 4 Cumulative distribution function for monitoring goods—Scenario 1 Private Information (T1) vs
Scenario 2 Information Sharing (T2 and T3)
13 When referring to the literature on remittance modeling, the migrant’s strategic behavior can be
interpreted as either self-insuring or altruistic by pleasing the MCCH when observed. These latter two
motives are observationally equivalent in our analysis, and a competing test between them is not possible
in this set up.
G. De Arcangelis, M. Joxhe
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Since the information randomization occurred at the individual level,14 to identify
the impact of different information settings we can rely on the random assignment of
information treatments across individuals, and estimate the following regression for
each migrant j:
yj ¼ αþ γInfoSharedj þ βXj þ εj ð1Þ
where yj is the monetary value of in-kind allocation in consumption or investment goods
(and their subcategories) and verifiable or strictly verifiable allocations. InfoSharedj is a
dummy variable and denotes that individual j was assigned to information Scenario (2)
Full Information Sharing—where the migrant knows that all the choices made will be
revealed to the MCCH in the Philippines. Therefore, the parameter “α” is the mean
allocation on the aggregate consumption or investment goods under Scenario (1) Pri-
vate Information, and the parameter “γ” returns the difference in the allocation due to
Scenario (2) when excluding the control variables. Xj are individual characteristics
obtained from the baseline survey that serve as control variables. We include age as it
may explain the increase in preferences for investment. The dummy female controls for
the gender of the respondent. Family characteristics back home, such as having or not
the spouse back home and the number of children in the Philippines, are also essential
for the choices in the budget allocation. We approximate other individual exogenous
variables (like health) with the level of income in Italy. We also include dummy
variables to control for the different education levels.
Before proceeding with a detailed analysis, Table 5 shows that the different
impacts of Treatments (2) and (3)—both aggregated in Scenario (2)—are not sig-
nificant. The regressions estimate two separate values of γ for Treatment (2)—
reported as Information Sharing in the Table 5a—and for Treatment (3)—Infor-
mation Sharing+ Social Excuse in the Table 5a, b—when addressing total con-
sumption and investment. Although the estimates are different (e.g., 78 euros versus
133 euros for consumption goods), the variance is high and the F-test does not
validate that the gap is significant. The p values reported at the bottom of Table 5a
are never higher than 0.14. The last two columns (7) and (8) report the estimates
when considering the difference between the allocations to consumption and
investment and both confirm the non-significant gap between Treatment (2) and (3).
The test of joint significance between the two Treatments also fails to reject the null
when considering all expenditure categories together (the p value for the F-test is
0.943). In Table 5b the sample has been restricted to consider only individuals
subject to Treatment (2) and (3), i.e., about 2/3 of the total sample. In this case the
dummy identifies the Treatment (3) effect and the estimated γ is reported in the first
line of Table 5b. Under all specifications the estimate, and therefore the difference
between the two treatments, is never significant. Merging of the two treatment groups
into the single Scenario (2) of full information sharing is then statistically legitimate.
14 We verify the randomization where the variables included into the three treatments are not statistically
different. See Table (9) in the Appendix B.
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Given the test results in Table 5, in Table 6 we consider just one single effect for
information sharing (or information symmetry) and report the estimated impact on
the aggregates and some subcategories.15
Table 6a considers the impact of the unique information sharing on broad cate-
gories16 as in Table 5. The migrants increase significantly (at the 95% significance
level) the amount apportioned for consumption goods by 10.0–10.5% (i.e., between
99.79 and 105.1 euros out of 1000) when they share information about allocations
with the MCCH. The contraction in investment mirrors the increase in consumption.
The decrease is mainly due to the education share of the budget according to the last
two columns of Table 6a. When the budget allocation for education is excluded, the
contraction in investment goods is confirmed but is imprecisely estimated due to the
wide reshuffling across the other items. When including other covariates as control
variables, the significant parameters identify that female migrants tend to send more
consumption and fewer investment goods independently of the information sharing
(at the 90% significant level), whereas there is an opposite tendency (less con-
sumption and more investment, especially for education) for migrants with a higher
household income in Italy. The significant change in the bundle composition
represents supportive evidence in favor of the signaling motive of in-kind giving by
Prendergast and Stole (2001), where the giver adapts the gift to the recipient’s
preferences when observed.
Table 6b reports the regression results for model (1) when the breakdown of goods
is referred to the ability of monitoring expenditures. Under Information Sharing
migrants tend to decrease the portion of verifiable goods by about 7–9% (i.e.,
between 72.43 and 93.36 euros out of 1000); similarly, when we focus on strictly
verifiable goods, the decrease is around 7% (i.e., between 70.40 and 71.89 euros out
of 1000). This evidence supports also the other possible interpretation of our
experiment, i.e., that migrants feel less constrained to choose monitoring goods in
case of Information Sharing. They reckon that, although some in-kind expenses are
easier to divert, the MCCH would not take advantage of less verifiable indications as
the MCCH is somewhat more involved in the expenditure allocation by observing
the choice list. When including other covariates, earning higher income in Italy
lessens this tendency, similarly to the case of consumption.
3.3 Heterogeneity analysis: inter- versus intra-household transfers
According to our definition of MCCH, remittances can be all considered intra-
household transfers. However, the head of the MCCH can be a very close relative
(spouse, son or daughter) or a more distant one (e.g., parent, grandparent, cousin,
uncle, etc.). Table 7 reports the composition of our sample in terms of kinship with
the head of the recipient MCCH.
It is well-known that conditional cash transfers (CCT) programs tend to target one
key individual in the family by assuming that the transfer is passed along as an intra-
household transfer. Hence, were these programs based on a correct hypothesis, a
significant difference should arise between intra- and inter-household transfers.
15 The sum is not 1000 as we allow the migrant to suggest personalized items.
16 Regression results on the various subcategories are reported in Appendix C.
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In Table 7 we propose a distinction between what can be defined a strictly intra-
household relation (spouse, son or daughter)—see the “Intra-hh” group of Table 7—and
kinship that could mimic an inter-household relationship. We have used this breakdown
to estimate the same model (1) but including control dummies for the interaction
between the intra-household nature of the transfer and the information scenario.
We vary model (1) and include the dummy variable for the intra-household
characteristic of the relationship (Intrahhj) and its interaction with Information
Sharing (Intrahhj  InfoSharedj):
yj ¼ αþ μIntrahhj þ δIntrahhj  InfoSharedj
þ γInfoSharedj þ βXj þ εj
ð2Þ
We are interested in the estimated values of the parameters µ and δ that returns
respectively the effect of being an intra-household transfer and the differential effect
of Information Sharing in intra-household transfers.
Panel (a) of Table 8 reports the estimation for the consumption–investment
breakdown. In intra-household relationships investment in education is sig-
nificantly affected. Depending on the specification, the education choice is sig-
nificantly higher for intra-household beneficiaries between 9% and 12% (91.3 and
119.4 euro out of 1000). This evidence confirms higher sensitivity of intra- rather
than inter-household transfers for the education usage of funds and reinforces
arguments in favor of CCT programs designed on transfers expected to be
redistributed productively intra-household—e.g., transfers to mothers to increase
or induce school attendance (see for instance Thomas 1990, Duflo 2003 and
recently Bauchet et al. 2018).
The estimates for the consumption goods and for other investment-type goods
(excluding education) show a negative effect—although only significant at the 10%
level and in just one specification for investment—as if there is a reshuffling within
the investment-type pool. Estimates of the parameter δ are negative, but not
Table 7 Relationship between
the migrant and the head of the
recipient MCCH
Kinship Frequency Percent
Intra-hh
Spouse 113 22.60
Son 31 6.20
Daughter 44 8.80
Inter-household
Parents 148 29.60
Grandparent 9 1.80
Grandchildren 2 0.40
Sister/brother 86 17.20
First cousin 2 0.40
Aunt/uncle 11 2.20
In-law 37 7.40
Other 17 3.40
Total 500 100.00
Intra-household allocation with shared expenditure choices: experimental evidence from. . .
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significant and no appreciable effect of Information Sharing within the intra-
household dimension is detected.
Panel (b) reports the estimates for the monitoring goods. In this case intra-
household transfers include a significantly higher portion of strictly verifiable goods
between 9.4 and 15% (94.5 and 145.4 euros out of 1000). The portion is higher also
for generally verifiable goods, but estimates are very imprecise. Also in this case
Information Sharing has a negative but not significant effect. This result could be
interpreted as if the migrant has a considerable degree of attention when choosing
what to transfer intra- versus inter-household.
4 Conclusions
Information sharing plays a relevant role in migrants’ choices on the destination of
resources for their recipient families. Migrants increase significantly the portion of
consumption goods by 10.0–10.5% (i.e., between 99.79 and 105.1 euros out of 1000)
only when they are observed by their recipients and the information on the com-
position of the budget is shared. This is evidence both of preference dissimilarity
between the migrant and the recipient family, and of the signaling motive for giving
(Prendergest and Stole 2001).
Moreover, information sharing can induce strategic behavior: the migrant would prefer
a smaller portion of goods that are (strictly) verifiable ex-post since she counts on the
household-recipient feeling more compelled to follow the expenditure choices. Indeed,
the budget for (strictly) verifiable goods is about 7–9% lower under information sharing.
Finally, in the case of intra-household transfers we have found a significantly
positive bias for investment in education (and for verifiable goods). This provides
evidence in favor of the intra-household design of conditional cash programs that
target education.
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5 Appendix A. Part of the survey instrument
*The game explanation:
Please tell us how would you like your MCCH to receive the €1000. We are not
going to give the money in cash, but in the way you tell us. It could be anything that
G. De Arcangelis, M. Joxhe
Author's personal copy
you want us to give to them (not what you think your family would want). What
you tell us will not affect the probability of wining for your family, since the winner
will be selected randomly.
Tell us what you really want us to give to your MCCH. Think well, and tell us all
what you really want, since if you win, that is exactly what we are going to give
them. It could be any type of expense or type of savings/investments. If this choice is
selected to be implemented, a project staff member will accompany each beneficiary
to purchase the item or pay for the expense specified.
It could be several things, but the total amount must add up to €1000.
The important thing is that this is what you want for your MCCH.
Items Euro
1. Food □ 1 ________
2. Clothes □ 2 ________
3. Rent payment □ 3 ________
4. Down payment on a house/land □ 4 ________
5. Current mortgage on a house/land □ 5 ________
6. Construction of a house (including repairs) □ 6
7. Medical expenditure and medicines □ 7 ________
8. Education expenses (tuition, books, etc). □ 8 ________
9. Utilities payment (electricity, water, etc.) □ 9 ________
10. Phone (house, cell phone, calling cards) □ 10 ________
11. Agricultural inputs □ 11 ________
12. Business expenses □ 12 ________
13. Savings20: (must state purpose)
13a. To buy a house □ 13a _______
13b. To buy land □ 13b _______
13c. To buy a vehicle □ 13c _______
13d. Marriage expenses □ 13d
13e. Others, specify: _________ □ 13e _______
14. Long-term investments (e.g., time deposit for 1 year+, mutual funds, stocks/shares). □ 14 ________
15. Large goods for the household (durables) □ 15 ________
16. Car or other vehicle □ 16________
17. Emigration expenditures □ 17 ________
18. Insurance (life, health, etc.) □ 18 _________
19. Marriage expenses □ 19 ________
20. Others, specify:________________________ □ 20 ________
20A special savings account will be opened in the Philippines where the money can only be withdrawn
once a target amount has been reached that is then used to purchase the item specified. Funds cannot just be
withdrawn in cash.
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What is the name of the head of your MCCH? _____________________ What is
your relationship to this person? *[Before marking the answer, repeat:] : Name of the
head of his/her MCCH is his/her:
1. Spouse
2. Son
3. Daughter
4. Parents
5. Grandparent
6. Grandchildren
7. Sister, Brother
8. First Cousin
9. Aunt, Uncle
10. In-law
11. Other (Specify): ____________________________
6 Appendix B. Balance tests
See in the Table 9.
7 Appendix C. Additional regression analysis on subcategories
Table 10 shows the same regression analysis when the dependent variables are the
various groups of consumption goods. We start with the budget destined to basic
consumption, and then, we include durables and services (see Table 1 for the
composition of the subgroups). As the readjustments occur across different con-
sumption groups, the analysis on the larger inclusive sets allows for more precise
estimations of the effect of the two information scenarios.17
The first significant effect is observed for basic consumption: when there is
information sharing with the MCCH the budget for basic consumption increases by
50 euros or approximately 25% with respect to the case of private information (see
column (1)). When adding durables (columns (3) and (4)), the effect increases to 113
euros or an increase of approximately 30%. Finally, when adding services (columns
(5) and (6)), the results replicate the first two columns of Table 6 hence reverting to a
slightly lower value. The stronger effect of durables is partly expected because it is a
type of consumption good that resembles the most an investment good and that the
migrant can also use when she returns.
17 For the single aggregate items, the effect of Scenario 2 will be positive but characterized by standard
errors so large that the statistics is not significant. We interpret this result as evidence of reshuffling across
grouped items. Other results on the single items are available upon request.
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Table 11 reports the results for the budget allocations for investment. Starting
from residential investment and adding successively financial investment and busi-
ness investment the effect of information sharing is negative, but very imprecise. It
becomes statistically significant only when including the (large) education portion of
the budget. This result was anticipated in Table 6, and it is confirmed for all of the
other sets of budget items related to investment.
When adding various controls (i.e., being of female gender, the head of the
MCCH is his/her spouse, having children in the Philippines, migrant’s income in
Italy, education level, place-of-the-interview fixed effects), the results are robust. The
variable detecting the degree of integration in Italy, as the level of household income
in Italy, is statistically significant and leans against the general effects, i.e., it has
negative effects on consumption items and a positive and significant effect on
investment. Instead, for the migrants with just primary education, there is a tendency
to favor consumption over investment, meaning that the education level of the
migrant plays an important role in the composition of the remittance bundle.
Table 9 Balance test across treatments
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Difference
(T1 vs T2)
Mean Mean Mean p value
Migrant is a female 0.75 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.81
Migrant’s age 42.92 (9.66) 40.47 (9.35) 43.36 (10.75) 0.02*
Migrant is married 0.71 (0.45) 0.65 (0.48) 0.67 (0.47) 0.49
Migrant’s number of
children
2.20 (1.57) 1.77 (1.32) 1.88 (1.46) 0.02*
Migrant’s year in Italy 9.47 (8.28) 9.51 (8.63) 9.98 (8.75) 0.837
Head of MCCH
is spouse
0.28 (0.45) 0.19 (0.39) 0.22 (0.41) 0.14
Primary education 0.05 (0.07) 0.05 (0.77) 0.06 (0.07) 0.99
Secondary education 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 0.12 (0.33) 0.16
College/university 0.64 (0.47) 0.71 (0.45) 0.75 (0.43) 0.10
Migrant’s
monthly Income
1038.81 (476.80) 1059.38 (668.91) 1032.10 (535.45) 0.90
Household efficiency 384.73 (288.46) 392.21 (313.54) 398.07 (330.84) 0.92
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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